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Abstract
This article addresses two important issues in public procurement: ex ante
uncertainty about the participating agents’ qualities and costs and their strate-
gic behaviour. We present a novel multi-dimensional auction that incentivises
agents to make a partial inquiry into the procured task and to honestly report
quality-cost probabilistic estimates based on which the principal can choose the
agent that offers the best value for money. The mechanism extends second
score auction design to settings where the quality is uncertain and it provides
incentives to both collect information and deliver desired qualities.
Keywords: Auctions/bidding; Information asymmetry; Uncertainty
modelling; Quality and cost uncertainty; Strictly proper scoring rules;
1. Introduction
Auctions are as popular as ever. Nowadays, auctions impact our everyday
lives in direct, as well as in less obvious ways: from electronic trade, on-line
marketplaces and Internet based business services, to on-line advertising and
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web-search engines. Such new services require new developments in auction
theory.
Traditional auction theory has been focusing on single-dimensional price
auctions that allocate an item to the highest bidder, or procure a service from
the cheapest supplier. Although such auctions have been widely used to procure
pre-specified services from suppliers at the lowest cost (Vickrey, 1961; Groves,
1973; Clarke, 1971), they may not be adequate to capture the complexities of
the information based digital economy where the traded good is often not a
well defined item. For example, in the purchase of a web-based service (e.g
on-line storage, web hosting) parameters such as the available bandwidth, the
robustness of the service, and the responsiveness may be just as important as
the price of the service. Similarly, in government procurement, projects such
as the construction of public infrastructure cannot be allocated solely to the
cheapest contractor. Parameters such as the quality of the materials, the design
and impact of the project on local communities and the environment often differ
from one proposal to another and should be taken into consideration. Examples
of such practices can be found on both sides of the Atlantic: the European
Union implements a procurement directive calling for both lowest cost and best
economic value (Asker & Cantillon, 2008), while the US Department of Defence
requires that procurement competitions consider also performance and quality
dimensions (Che, 1993).
In his seminal paper Che (1993), Che designed a series of multi-dimensional
auctions (first score, second score and second preferred score) to address cases
where not only the cost, but also the the quality of a product is important.
In these auctions, suppliers report their production quality and the associ-
ated costs, and the mechanism maps the multi-dimensional bid into a single-
dimensional evaluation referred as a ‘score’. All three auctions are incentive
compatible, and based on the assumption that costs are independently dis-
tributed the first and second score auctions implement the socially optimal
(allocatively efficient) outcome. Branco Branco (2007) relaxed the assumption
of independent costs by introducing a two-stage multi-dimensional auction for
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settings with correlation among suppliers’ costs. A mechanism proposed by
Bogetoft & Nielsen (2008) further exploited the correlations among the costs
of different agents via Data Envelopment Analysis (Charnes et al., 1979, 1987)
based competition.
More applications of score auctions can be found in Computer Science litera-
ture and in particular in multi-agent systems and e-commerce (He et al., 2003).
Bichler Bichler (2000) paves the way for possible e-commerce applications of
multi-dimensional auctions by showing that they result in a significantly higher
utility when compared to single-dimensional auctions in a web-based experi-
mental setting. Furthermore, Beil and Wein in Beil & Wein (2003) propose
an iterative mechanism in which the principal sequentially estimates each bid-
der’s cost function through a series of score auctions. Parkes and Kalagnanam
Parkes & Kalagnanam (2005) also propose an iterative multi-attribute price-
based procurement auction in which agents in each round submit their bids
and a winner maximising the principal’s preference is selected. They show that
their mechanism terminates with a modified Vickrey-Clarke-Groves allocation.
Multi-dimensional auctions can also be applied in settings where multiple sup-
pliers are necessary to satisfy the principal’s demand (Bichler & Kalagnanam,
2003).
Now, although these approaches address important issues in procurement,
they rely on two significant assumptions. First, they assume that the principal
will enforce truthful reporting of agents’ qualities through external means. They
do not give agents control of their reported (and consequently contracted) quali-
ties, or they assume that in case the observed quality deviates from the reported
one, the auction may be cancelled or heavy fines may be issued to the winner of
the auction (Che, 1993). Second, existing literature assumes stochasticity solely
for the production costs. In the very few cases where misreporting quality is con-
sidered (Papakonstantinou & Bogetoft, 2013), qualities are deterministic. We
find this assumption particularly un-realistic, since often the agents qualities
may depend on stochastic factors (i.e. availability of certain materials, weather
conditions, faults). In such cases, the principal faces the significant challenge of
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eliciting accurate probabilistic estimates of the agents’ qualities and based on
them making a decision.
To address situations where it is costly to generate the aforementioned qual-
ity estimates, we introduce strictly proper scoring rule payment in a multi-
dimensional auction. Strictly proper scoring rules are designed to elicit accurate
predictions by rewarding forecasters based on how close the actual outcome is to
their prediction (Savage, 1977; Hendrickson & Buehler, 1971; Friedman, 1983).
Strictly proper scoring rules have been widely used in mechanism design to elicit
accurate information and in particular to design reputation systems that pro-
mote truthful reporting on a service experience (Jurca & Faltings, 2005, 2006,
2007). Furthermore, it has been shown how an appropriately scaled strictly
proper scoring rule can be used to incentivise agents to invest costly resources
when generating their forecasts Miller et al. (2005, 2007). Extensions are given
in Papakonstantinou et al. (2011) and Witkowski & Parkes (2012), with a brief
summary of the main insights provided in Section 3.
In this paper we combine elements from multi-dimensional auctions and
information elicitation mechanisms. Specifically, we consider a procurement
setting where agents commit resources to estimate their production qualities,
which they, in turn, report to the principal. These quality estimates are costly
for all agents irrespective of the auction’s final outcome. This relates our work
to all-pay auctions, where agents’ bids model the effort exerted in acquiring
a ‘prize’. For example, Anderson et al. (1998) introduces an all-pay auction
whereby the contract is allocated to the agent with the highest bid and the
agents face bidding costs directly proportional to the actual bid. McAdams in
McAdams (2006) considers a more general multi-unit multi-dimensional all-pay
auction where agents’ costs are quadratic functions of their bids. The fact that
in our proposed mechanism the principal allocates the task based solely on the
agents’ estimates of their quality, which are not drawn from the same underlying
distribution, differentiates our work from both aforementioned cases.
We propose a procurement auction where instead of having to complete the
allocated task ex ante in order to participate, heterogeneous agents provide
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estimates of the quality they intend to produce. The selected agent is allocated
the project and once it is completed the principal observes the outcome and
issues a payment that compensates for both data collection and production
costs. As opposed to existing implementations of all-pay auctions where agents
competing for a contract risk not getting paid even if they complete the task (cf.
Liu et al. (2014)), in the proposed mechanism, the principal can penalise the
selected agent depending on potential deviations between the agent’s reported
estimated quality and the actual produced one.
We provide a solid theoretical foundation for our procedure. We show incen-
tive compatibility and individual rationality. We also show that in expectation
and under the use of a consistent set of Bayesian estimators, our mechanism
achieves the outcome of the second score auction in which agents are able to
directly report their actual quality outcomes. Finally, we evaluate our mech-
anism numerically in a setting where agents’ investigations are represented by
samples of Gaussian distributions. The mechanism’s computational aspects are
discussed and its convergence to the outcome of the second score auction is
demonstrated through numerical simulations. The simulations complement our
theoretical findings.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we describe the
setting in more details, and in Section 3 we provide the relevant background in
strictly proper scoring rules. In Section 4 we define the mechanism, while in
Section 5 we outline and prove the economic properties. In Section 6 we evaluate
the mechanism though numerical simulations and in Section 7 we conclude and
provide some insights on future work.
2. The context
We consider a principal interested in procuring a task or a service from
one of N rational and risk neutral agents. The provided task or service may
be an independent task or part of a more complex one, without this affecting
our analysis. The task can be characterised by multiple parameters in an s-
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dimensional vector of qualities yi0 ∈ Rs with yi0 > 0 and i ∈ I = {1, . . . N}. To
simplify the analysis, however, we assume that for each agent the parameters of
its service can be aggregated in one variable, yi0 ∈ R, with each agent having a
single quality profile.
We depart from the existing literature by introducing uncertainty regard-
ing the agents’ qualities. We model uncertainty by assuming that each agent i
commits variable degree of resources when estimating his individual quality yi0,
which denotes the ground truth estimated by agent i but observed by the prin-
cipal after the task is complete and if agent i was actually the selected provider
. Let an agent’s estimate be a predictive distribution denoted by a parametric
distribution with mean yi and precision θi i.e., F(yi, θi). The estimates are
assumed to be unbiased such that yi is independently drawn from F(yi0, θi)
i.e., yi ∼ F(yi0, θi). We do not restrict our analysis to a specific distribu-
tion, although for the numerical evaluation of the mechanism we use Gaussian
distributions following the data fusion literature Gregory (2005); DeGroot &
Schervish (2002).
Under this information uncertainty framework, the estimate’s precision rep-
resents the resources invested in generating that estimate. Hence, the cost
associated with the collection of the information about the quality, increases as
precision θi increases. We will therefore model data collection cost ci as a con-
vex, increasing and double differentiable function such as ci(θi) = Ciθi
2
, where
Ci > 0 is a parameter which represents different base costs for each agent.
We assume that the cost parameter is common knowledge, while the agents’
precisions are private to each agent.
Now, regarding the production costs, we follow the existing literature (Che,
1993) by assuming that agents are capable of producing different levels of out-
puts, and that in order to produce the quality yi0 agent i needs inputs which
depend on each agent’s efficiencies. These inputs are the costs involved in pro-
duction and should not be confused with the costs involved in the estimation
of the quality. Here, costs are private information to each agent and cannot be
verified by any third party. The cost xi an agent faces in the production of his
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Figure 1: The time-line of the game.
quality is denoted as xi(yi0, l
i), where li represents the agent’s private informa-
tion about his production cost (in)efficiency. While agents are aware of their cost
parameters, the principal has only access to their distribution. We assume that
li is independently and identically distributed over [l, l] with 0 < l < l < +∞
according to a distribution with positive and continuously differentiable density
function. Finally, the cost function is increasing in both quality and the cost
(in)efficiency parameter and it is convex in the quality.
Based on the above, the time-line (Figure 1) of the game is as follows. Ini-
tially, each agent collects information about his likely production quality and
calculates the corresponding production costs. By sampling with precision θi,
and spending information collection costs ci(θi) he is able to predict his quality
yi and based on that predict the cost of the production as well. We assume that
the agent can send possibly manipulated signals about his production quality
level, his production costs, and the precision of his prediction to the principal
before the principal decides on the provider. Let the signalled production be
ŷi, the signalled data collection effort be θ̂i, and the signalled cost be x̂i. The
principal can use these signals to choose the provider and based on the realised
quality yi0 determine a reimbursement. If the principal picks agent i as the
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provider, his value of the realised quality yi0 will be given by V (y
i
0) where V (·)
is an increasing, concave and twice differentiable function of the quality.
To sum up, in this setting the principal has to deal with poor quality and
cost estimates generated by agents not committing significant resources to the
pre-bidding information collection, with misreporting of the estimates and with
incentivising the winning agent to actually produce the final outputs.
3. Strictly proper scoring rules
Before turning to the details of the mechanism, it is convenient to discuss the
simpler problem of inducing agents to collect information about their qualities
and to reveal their findings.
So-called strictly proper scoring rules are used as a tool for eliciting fore-
casters’ beliefs of future events in various domains ranging from meteorology
and weather forecasting to computer science and on-line trust and reputation
systems. Such scoring rules incentivise a risk neutral forecaster to truthfully re-
port his forecast by maximising his expected reward. Imagine that a forecaster’s
prediction y of an event y0 follows the distribution F with the report denoted
as F̂ . The forecaster’s corresponding score is then S(y0|F̂) and the expected
score is
S(F̂ ,F) =
∫ ∞
−∞
FS(y0|F̂)dy0 (1)
The scoring rule S defined as strictly proper if its expected value, S(F̂ ,F), is
maximised by truthful reporting i.e. S(F ,F) ≥ S(F̂ ,F). Due to this property, a
payment based on such a scoring rule can create incentives for truthful reporting.
Furthermore, strictly proper scoring rules can guarantee sufficient data col-
lection effort on behalf of the agents. This process is described by Miller et al.
(2005) who note that by using an affine function α + βS of a strictly proper
scoring rule S as a payment, it is possible to induce an agent to make and
truthfully report an estimate at a specific precision θ0.
In this case, the agent’s expected payment , P (θ), is
P (θ) = αS(θ) + β
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where α and β are the scaling parameters in the affine transformation, θ is
the agent’s true precision, and S(θ) is the twice differentiable expected score
function. Parameter α guarantees that the estimate will be generated at the
appropriate precision, while β compensates the agent for the cost of his estimate.
Consequently, the expected utility to an agent net of data collection costs is
U(θ) = αS(θ) + β − c(θ)
Now assume there is a principal interested in acquiring an estimate at a specific
precision denoted as θ0. She will choose a value for α so that the agent’s precision
is equal to θ0. That is, the principal selects an α which maximises the agent’s
expected utility at θ0 by solving
dU
dθ
∣∣∣
θ0
= 0 to give
α =
c′(θ0)
S
′
(θ0)
(2)
The β parameter serves only to safeguard participation in the mechanism
by ensuring that the agent’s expected utility is positive. Presuming that the
expected utility from the data collection and reporting alone shall be at least 0
we get
β = c(θ0)− c
′(θ0)
S
′
(θ0)
S(θ0) (3)
Based on Equations 2 and 3 we calculate the specific values of α and β which
also depend on the strictly proper scoring rule used. This raises the important
issue of which one of the most common rules (i.e., quadratic, spherical, logarith-
mic and parametric) the principal should select given that they have additional
properties besides incentivising truthful reporting and eliciting sufficient effort.
Papakonstantinou (2010) provides a thorough comparison of the four rules used
as the basis of a second price single-dimensional auction including their analyt-
ical forms for Gaussian distributions and their bounds. It can be seen that the
logarithmic rule and the parametric one with the parameter converging to 1,
lead to the lowest expected payments, but they do not have lower bounds. This
may result to un-realistically high penalties to agents that generate extremely
inaccurate estimates with very low likelihood (i.e., F → 0). However, the para-
metric scoring rule offers a good compromise for values of the parameter within
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(1, 1.5) as it can keep the payment relatively low for the majority of the agents,
and the finite lower bound protects agents with extremely poor estimates.
4. The mechanism
The proposed mechanism implements a two-step payment to the agent that
is selected to complete the procured project. That agent, is the one with the
highest score based solely on his reported beliefs of his quality.In this context, the
first payment to the selected agent is equal to the second score auction’s payment
based on his reported quality and the corresponding cost. Once that agent
produces his quality and it is observed by the principal, he receives a secondary
payment. This payment penalises inaccurate reports, and compensates for the
data collection activities and the actual production.
The mechanism is formally defined as follows:
1. Principal invites N agents to participate in the procurement auction and
announces that she needs estimates of their quality levels at precision θ0.
2. Agents generate estimates with means yi and precisions θi, and report ŷ
i,
θ̂i and the corresponding production costs x̂i with i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
3. Each bid is assigned a score Zi = Z(x̂i, ŷi) = V (ŷi)− x̂i.
4. The principal allocates the project to the agent with the highest score.
5. The selected agent receives his first payment from the principal: PA =
PA(x̂
(1), ŷ(1)) = V (ŷ(1))−Z(x̂(2), ŷ(2)) similar to the payment in a second
score auction1.
6. The selected agent produces quality y0.
7. The principal observes the agent’s realised quality and issues the second
payment:
PB = PB(y0|ŷ(1), θ0, x̂(1)) = d(y0|ŷ(1), θ0)PA+
1Superscripts (1) and (2) correspond to the agent with the highest and second highest
score respectively.
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+αS(y0|ŷ(1), θ̂(1)) + β + V (y0)− Z(x̂(2), ŷ(2))
where d(y0|ŷ(1)θ0) is a function that evaluates the selected agent’s reported
estimate based on the observed actual production, cf. below, parameters
α and β are the effort inducing parameters from the scaled strictly proper
scoring rule S(y0|ŷ(1), θ̂(1)).
Like parameters α and β, the function d(·) serves to guarantee truthful
reporting and that agents will generate estimates at the required precision in a
setting where the agents’ reports can deviate from their actual production due to
unforeseen circumstances (endemic uncertainty) and due to strategic behaviour.
In order to address both these effects, the deviation function d(·) is set equal to
d(y0|ŷ(1), θ̂(1)) = S(y0|ŷ(1), θ̂(1))− S(θ0)− 1 (4)
where θ0 is the precision required by the principal, S(y0|ŷ(1), θ0) is the scoring
rule and S(θ0) is the expected score as a function of the required precision.
The total payment a truthful agent expects to derive by this mechanism is
P (θ) = [S(θ)− S(θ0)][V (y)− Z(2)] + αS(θ)− β + V (y0)− Z(2) (5)
In order to demonstrate how the mechanism works in practice, we provide a
simple conceptual example while taking note that a more elaborate case study
is presented in Section 6.1. Let us consider a business owner (principal) con-
tracting the construction of a professional website. The firms participating in
the procurement have received some specifications, while much of the techni-
cal details e.g., bandwidth, storage space, are left on them to decide based
on their estimates of the website’s traffic, with the principal providing some
guidelines on how to estimate it. Let the specifications and corresponding un-
certainty be aggregated in one quantity (referred as ‘quality’) and the guide-
lines on how to estimate traffic expressed by the required precision θ0. For the
purpose of this example, we assume that the quality estimates are modelled
as Gaussian distributions. Having generated their estimates and calculated
the production costs, the firms report them with the principal receiving three
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bids: (9, 1, 72.9), (4, 1, 16), (16, 1, 224) in the form of (mean, precision, produc-
tion cost) whereby production costs are calculated based on x(y) = ci ∗ y2 with
ci = {0.9, 1, 0.875}.
Following the procedure of the mechanism, the principal calculates the scores
and procures the service to the firm with the highest score. If the firms’ value
function is given by V (y) = 50 ∗√(y) + 25, the corresponding scores will be
Zi = {102.1, 109, 1} (Steps 3 and 4). The firm with the highest score (firm 2)
receives the contract and the first payment, PA, equal to 125 − 102.1 = 22.9
(Step 5) and then proceeds to create the contracted website, that is to produce
quality equal to 4.2 (Step 6). Using the logarithmic scoring rule and Gaussian
distributions to model the estimates, parameters α and β are calculated based
on Papakonstantinou et al. (2011) as 2c and c(2 − ln 12pi ) respectively. To this
end, assuming information collection cost for firm 2 roughly at the 1/100 of the
production cost so that C = 0.16, it receives the second payment, PB , equal to
14.73 (Step 7).
In the following section, we prove the mechanism’s economic properties. After
showing how the expression of the total payment in Equation 5 is derived, we
prove that true revelation of an agent’s estimates and costs is a Nash equilibrium
and that the selected agent receives positive utility in expectation.
5. Economic properties
Having described in detail the mechanism, we now develop its economic
properties. First, we show that the utility of a selected agent is maximised by
generating an estimate at the principal’s required precision (Lemma 1). Based
on this result, we show that truthful revelation of the production costs is an
optimal strategy, given the truthful report of the quality estimate generated by
a sequence of consistent estimators (Lemma 2). Generalising these two specific
results allows to show the mechanism’s immunity to combined misreporting and
that truth revelation is in-fact a Nash equilibrium. Specifically we show that:
1. Agents generate their estimates at the principal’s required precision.
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2. The mechanism is immune to the effects of combined misreporting of qual-
ity and cost with truth revelation being a Nash equilibrium.
3. The mechanism is individually rational for the selected agent.
Lemma 1. The expected utility of the selected agent is maximised only by gen-
erating an estimate at the principal’s required precision and truthfully revealing
it.
Proof. Given the mechanism described above, when an agent reports his esti-
mate, he must do so with a precision up to the one required by the principal.
The selected2 agent’s utility when he reports (ŷ, θ̂), given realised quality equal
to y0, is
U(y0 | ŷ, θ̂) = V (ŷ)− Z(2) + [S(y0|ŷ, θ̂)− S(θ0)− 1][V (ŷ)− Z(2)]+
+αS(y0|ŷ, θ̂) + β + V (y0)− Z(2) − x(y0)− c(θ)
where α and β are the strictly proper scoring rules scaling parameters defined
in Section 3.
By integrating over the set of possible qualities y0 we derive the expected
utility from reporting (ŷ, θ̂):
U(ŷ, θ̂) =
∫ ∞
−∞
F(y0|y, θ)[V (ŷ)− Z(2)]dy0
+
∫ ∞
−∞
F(y0|y, θ)[S(y0|ŷ, θ̂)− S(θ0)− 1][V (ŷ)− Z(2)]dy0
+
∫ ∞
−∞
F(y0|y, θ)[αS(y0|ŷ, θ̂) + β]dy0
+
∫ ∞
−∞
F(y0|y, θ)[V (y0)− Z(2) − x(y0)− c(θ)]dy0
Since the initial payment does not depend on the final outcome and
∫∞
−∞ F(y0|y, θ)dy0 =
1, a shorter expression is derived:
U(ŷ, θ̂) = [V (ŷ)− Z(2)]
∫ ∞
−∞
F(y0|y, θ)[S(y0|ŷ, θ̂)− S(θ0)]dy0
2In order to simplify our notation we omit the use of superscript (1) to denote the agent
with the highest score, while we maintain the use of (2) for the runner-up agent. We will also
be using the simplified version of the auction scores i.e.Zi = Z(x̂i, ŷi)
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+∫ ∞
−∞
αF(y0|y, θ)S(y0|ŷ, θ̂)dy0+β−c(θ)+
∫ ∞
−∞
F(y0|y, θ)[V (y0)−x(y0)]dy0+Z(2)
The above expression can be further simplified by using the notation of the
expected score:
S(F̂ ,F) =
∫ ∞
−∞
F(y0|y, θ)S(y0|ŷ, θ̂)dy0
where F̂ represents the prediction corresponding to the reported parameters
(ŷ, θ̂) and F the actual distribution of the production quality.
To sum up, the selected agent’s expected utility from estimating and report-
ing his quality is:
U(ŷ, θ̂) = [V (ŷ)− Z(2)][S(F̂ ,F)− S(θ0)] + αS(F̂ ,F) + β
+
∫ ∞
−∞
F(y0|y, 1/θ)[V (y0)− x(y0)]dy0 + Z(2) − c(θ)
Having defined the selected agent’s expected utility function we proceed to
show that it is maximised when the agent’s reported estimate is equal to his true
one, generated at a precision equal to the principal’s required one. Initially, it
is easy to see that due to the use of a strictly proper scoring rule, the expected
scoring rule S(F̂ ,F) is maximised at F̂ = F , hence (y, θ) is a local maximum
for the expected score.
In order to show that (y, θ) is a maximum point for U , we first show that it
is a critical one,
∂U
∂ŷ
= V ′(ŷ)[S(F̂ ,F)− S(θ̂)] + [V (ŷ)− Z(2) + α]∂S(F̂ ,F)
∂ŷ
= 0 (6)
∂U
∂θ̂
= [V (ŷ)− Z(2) + α]∂S(F̂ ,F)
∂θ̂
= 0 (7)
From the definition of a strictly proper scoring rule, the partial derivatives
of S(F̂ ,F) w.r.t ŷ and θ̂ are equal to 0, for (ŷ, θ̂) = (y, θ), hence the first order
conditions for U are fulfilled by (y, θ).
Moreover, the determinant of the Hessian matrix of U is
Det(H(U))(y, θ) = [V (y)− Z(2) + α]2[∂
2S
∂ŷ2
∂2S
∂θ̂2
− ∂
2S
∂ŷ∂θ̂
∂2S
∂θ̂∂ŷ
] =
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= [V (y)− Z(2) + α]2Det(H(S))(y, θ) (8)
which is positive given that [V (y) − Z(2) + α]2 > 0 and Det(H(S))(y, θ) > 0
since (y, θ) is a maximum for the expected score S.
Having shown that (y, θ) is a maximum for the selected agent’s expected
utility, it is trivial to prove based on the definition of the parameters α and β in
Section 3 that a selected agent can maximise his utility by making an estimate
at a certain precision, in this particular case equal to principal’s requirement of
θ0. In such case, the utility he expects to derive is equal to
U(y) =
∫ ∞
−∞
F(y0|y, 1/θ)[V (y0)− x(y0)]dy0 − Z(2) (9)
Lemma 2. The use of consistent estimators for the respective outcomes, yi0,
guarantees that agents’ expected utilities are maximised by truthfully revealing
their production cost given that they have truthfully revealed their quality esti-
mates.
Proof. As already mentioned in Section 2, we model uncertainty in agents’ qual-
ities by assuming individual estimates as parametric distributions with means yi
and precision θi such that yi ∼ F(yi0, θi). Now, the use of a consistent sequence
of estimators for the estimation of y0i e.g. a sequence of sample means (DeGroot
& Schervish, 2002) for the estimation of the mean of a Gaussian distribution
(i.e. F = N )3 suggest that for a sufficiently large sample of observations the
utility a truthful selected agent expects to derive is equal to:
U(y) =
∫ ∞
−∞
F(y0|y, 1/θ)[V (y0)−x(y0)]dy0−Z(2) = V (y)−x(y)−Z(2) = Z(1)−Z(2)
Based on the use of a consistent estimator, we proceed to prove this Lemma
by contradiction:
3In Section 6 we show that this assumption does not limit the implementation of the
mechanism based on an example with Gaussian distributions and a Bayesian estimator of its
mean. We evaluate the estimator’s convergence and its effect on the mechanism.
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Let x and y be an agent’s true cost and quality, Z the score that corresponds
to these true values, and let x̂, ŷ be the reports and Ẑ the score corresponding
to these reports. Furthermore, let x(2), y(2), Z(2) be the bids, and the score of
the runner up agent (i.e. Ẑ > Z(2)).
First, let an agent’s misreporting of his cost have an impact on the outcome
of the auction. We consider the following two cases:
1. Agent wins by misreporting while it would have lost if truthful.
2. Agent loses by misreporting while it would have won if truthful.
• In Case (1) agent reports his cost s.t Ẑ > Z(2) given that Z < Z(2). The
agent achieves this by reporting a lower cost than his actual one i.e. x̂ < x.
Under optimal reporting of quality, the utility of an agent misreporting
his cost in Case (1) will be negative i.e. U(y) = V (y) − x(y) − Z(2) =
Z(1) − Z(2) < 0.
• In Case (2) agent reports his cost such that Ẑ < Z(2) given that Z > Z(2).
The agent would have won the auction, and therefore would be selected,
but instead reports a cost greater than his actual one i.e. x̂ > x. As
a result, the agent loses the auction and consequently receives negative
utility (since he still faces the costs of determining his quality).
Second, we assume that the agent misreports his cost of production without
this affecting whether he wins the auction or not. If the agent had already
lost the auction, misreporting would have no additional effect given that the
utility would be negative due to the cost of determining his quality without any
dependence on the cost of production. Had the agent already won the auction,
misreporting would not result in additional benefits. Specifically, both payments
depend on the second lowest score, that is, the payment for the reported and
actually produced (for the second stage) quality and the compensation for his
estimate.
Theorem 1. The mechanism is immune to combined misreporting of quality
and cost.
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Proof. In the above proofs we showed that a selected agent maximises his ex-
pected utility by truthfully reporting his production quality if he reports truth-
fully his cost, and that the same holds for an agent’s costs, given that he gen-
erated an accurate estimate of his quality by investing the required amount of
resources in determining it. However, given the multi-dimensional nature of the
bids an agent could attempt to manipulate the principal by misreporting both
costs and the precision of his quality estimate.
In this proof we examine agents’ combined strategic behaviour. In order
to demonstrate how it is not optimal for an agent to deviate from truthful
behaviour we consider the four following general cases of misreporting:
1. Agent wins the auction by misreporting both his estimate of quality and
production cost
2. Agent wins the auction with the misreporting having no effect on the
auction’s outcome
3. Agent loses the auction due to his misreporting
4. Agent loses the auction despite his misreporting
• In Case (1) the agent reports his estimate of quality and cost such that Ẑ >
Z(2), while Z < Z(2), with the precision of the estimate θ not necessarily
equal to the principal’s θ0. We will show that the misreporting agent’s
expected utility U(ŷ, θ̂) will always be less or equal to the utility of a
truthful agent U(y, θ0) following the principal’s instructions:
U(ŷ, θ̂)−U(y, θ0) = [V (ŷ)−Z(2)][S(F̂ ,F)−S(θ0)] +αS(F̂ ,F) + β− c(θ)
(10)
Regarding V (ŷ)−Z(2) we have assumed that it is a positive quantity since
Ẑ > Z(2) ⇒ V (ŷ) − x̂(ŷ) > Z(2) ⇒ V (ŷ) > Z(2), while S(F̂ ,F) − S(θ0)
is negative since S(F̂ ,F) ≤ S(θ0) given that S is a strictly proper scoring
rule. Finally, from Section 3 it can be trivially shown that αS(F̂ ,F) +
β − c(θ) < 0 for θ < θ0; hence U(ŷ, θ̂) ≤ U(y, θ0).
• In Case (2) the agent would have won the auction anyway, and although
misreporting of cost and quality will have no impact on the outcome of the
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auction, it may have on the secondary payment. Still, such manipulation
is not attractive since we have from Case (1) that U(ŷ, θ̂) ≤ U(y, θ0). Even
if we assume that the estimate’s precision is equal to required one by the
principal, it is still the misreporting of the estimate and the production
cost which makes this strategy sub-optimal.
• Cases (3) and (4) are simpler. For both cases it is obvious that the utility
of an agent not winning the auction will solely consist of the cost of data
collection. Specifically, in Case (3) the agent deliberately misreports his
estimate and his production cost in order to lose. It would be in his best
interest to invest minimum resources in generating his estimate, so that
he can minimise his inevitable loss. However, that is not a straightforward
decision. Estimates of low precision may end up winning the auction and
inflicting additional losses, while estimates of high precision will increase
his losses. Effectively, an agent that wants to lose the auction has no
reason to participate in it, specially given the assumption of rational and
risk neutral participants.
Now, in Case (4) the agent misreports with the intention to win but ends
up losing the auction. Had the agent won, it would result in negative
utility as shown in Case (1) and given that the agent intends to win, he
will invest the required resources in generating his estimate, hence his loss
due to prediction costs will increase.
Having shown that combined misreporting of costs, estimates of qualities
and their precision leads to sub-optimal outcomes including negative utilities,
we proved that the mechanism is immune to this type of strategic behaviour.
In conjunction with Lemma 2, this leads to the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Truth revelation of an agent’s quality and cost is a Nash equilib-
rium.
Proof. A selected agent maximises his expected utility by reporting his true
production costs and qualities which are generated at the precision required
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by the principal. Nevertheless, Lemma 2 imposes an additional constraint by
proving that an agent will reveal his true production cost under the assumption
that he has truthfully revealed his quality estimate. For this to hold for an
individual agent it must extend to all others, thus weakening the equilibrium of
the proposed mechanism and moving it from dominant strategy to Nash.
Theorem 2. The use of consistent estimators for the respective outcomes, yi0,
guarantees that the utility of the selected agent is positive in expectation.
Proof. The utility an agent that has truthfully reported his estimates, his pre-
cisions and the productions costs, expects to derive is given by
U(y) = V (y)− x(y)− Z(2) = Z(1) − Z(2)
Given that V (y)− x(y) is the selected agent’s true score, the utility is positive
on expectation, hence the mechanism is interim individually rational for that
specific agent.
It should be noted that the above proof holds for any strictly proper scoring
rule. However, it is possible to move to a stronger individual rationality concept
(ex-post individual rationality) by restricting the analysis to the four most well
known strictly proper scoring rules (i.e. quadratic, spherical, logarithmic and
parametric). This leads to the following corollary:
Corollary 2. The use of consistent estimators for the respective outcomes, yi0,
guarantees that the utility of the selected agent is positive for each one of the
quadratic, spherical, logarithmic and parametric scoring rules.
Proof. The use of a consistent sequence of estimators implies that for relative
large samples of observations during the estimation process the selected agent’s
estimate will be very close to the actual outcome y0, effectively allowing to
replace y with y0. After this transformation, the selected agent’s utility function
takes the following form
U(y0) = [S(y0)− S(θ) + 1][V (y0)−Z(2)] + αS(y0) + β − x(y0)− c(θ)− x(y0) =
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[S(y0)− S(θ)][V (y0)− Z(2)] + [S(y0)− S(θ)] c
′(θ)
S
′
(θ)
+ Z(1) − Z(2)
We have already shown that V (y0) − Z(2) > 0 and Z(1) − Z(2) > 0; also given
that both c(.) and S(.) are increasing
c′(θ)
S
′
(θ)
> 0. Based on the above and on the
analytic calculations of S(y0) for the four strictly proper scoring rules listed in
Section 3 and of the expected values S
′
(θ) derived by Papakonstantinou et al.
(2011) it can be seen that the expression of the selected agent’s utility is indeed
positive.
6. Numerical evaluation
In this section we evaluate the robustness of the mechanism in a scenario
which does not involve the theoretical assumptions regarding a sufficiently large
sample of observations, since this may not be plausible in an applied setting.
In order to do so, first we explain the sampling and estimation process and
then proceed to demonstrate how this mechanism works through an illustrative
example. We then undertake a series of simulations to get a better understand-
ing of its performance. We compare our mechanism with two benchmark cases
and highlight the costs of uncertainty regarding the agents’ predictions of their
quality.
Specifically, as the first benchmark case, labelled as ‘Second Score: Out-
come’, we use the standard second score auction (SSA) under the assumption
that there is no uncertainty and agents can directly report their actual quali-
ties yi0. For the second case, labelled as ‘Second Score: Belief’, we introduce
uncertainty in the model and modify the second score auction so it uses the
agents’ beliefs of their qualities instead of the actual outcomes of the previous
case, under the assumption that the principal can elicit their truthful reporting
without external means such as fixed penalties and fines.
Against this background, let agent i attempt to estimate his individual qual-
ity yi0 by generating a sample of M independent observations y
i
j , j ∈ {1, ...,M}.
As already mentioned, agents do not know their quality ex ante; instead they
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have an a-priori belief which they update by collecting additional information.
We assume that agent i’s a-priori belief about yi0 is given as y
i
0 ∼ N (yiµ, 1/θiµ),
and that he is able to collect further information about yi0 by generating M in-
dependent and identically distributed random observations {yi1, yi2, ... , yiM} with
yij ∼ N (yi0, 1/θij). Using these observations, the agent can update hid a-priori
beliefs to a posterior belief
yi0 ∼ N (
yiµθ
i
µ + θ
iy¯i
θiµ + θ
i
,
1
θiµ + θ
i
) (11)
where y¯i is the mean of the observations {yi1, yi2, ... , yiM} and θi is the resulting
precision of the sample average y¯i, i.e. θi = Mθij . By sampling with precision θ
i,
and spending information collection costs ci(θi) it is able to predict its quality
yi as (yiµθ
i
µ + y¯
iθi)/(θiµ + θ
i) with precision θiµ + θ
i.
In the simulations, we consider a specific case in which the parameters yiµ of
the agents’ prior beliefs of their production qualities are drawn from the uniform
distribution U(2, 5), while we assume that the agents’ precisions in both priors
and individual observations during data collection are equal to 1. Consequently,
given the parameters of our model, the actual production quality level follows
the Gaussian distribution N (yiµ, 1). Furthermore, the agents’ production cost
functions are given by xi = Xiy2, where Xi ∼ U(0, 1), while the costs of data
collection are linear functions, given by ci = Ciθ, where Ci ∼ U(0.001, 0.002).
Note that the bounds in the distribution of the data collection cost parameter are
selected so that even for relative large samples the overall cost is relative small
compared to the actual production cost. A scenario whereby data collection
cost would be higher than the production cost is not considered to be neither
interesting nor realistic.
The principal’s value function is given by V (y) = B(1− e−y), with B = 20
guaranteeing that there will be some agents with positive scores V (y) − x(y)
in the range of qualities we use. This particular value function is both increas-
ing and concave and it provides some curvature, as opposed to a conventional
approach such as V (y) = B
√
y which is almost linear in the range of B that
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guarantees positive scores.
The mechanism is simulated 105 times, with 20 agents participating in the
auction, while the precision of each agent’s sample average, and consequently
his sample of observations, M , ranges from 1 to 100. Our theoretical analysis
suggests that the principal’s required precision θ0 also takes values from 1 to
100. For each iteration we record the selected agent’s utility, his payment, his
prediction and production costs and whether the agent selected by our mecha-
nism is the agent that would have been selected had there been no uncertainty
(we refer that agent as a ‘proper winner’). For the calculations that involve a
lack of uncertainty, the agents will report their actual outcome yi0 directly. In a
given iteration all agents face underlying cost functions of the same form, but
their priors, sample observations and cost parameters differ. Due to the number
of iterations the standard error in the mean values plotted is in the range of
10−4 to 10−5 and thus we omit the use of error bars for clarity.
6.1. An illustrative example
For a snapshot of the mechanism, we calculate several of the mechanism’s
elements i.e. selected agents, payments and costs as the sample’s precision
increases. Specifically, Table 1 lists the selected agent in our mechanism and
the winner of the second score auction with no uncertainty (i.e. Second Score:
Outcome), denoted as w and w′ respectively. We also calculate the parts of the
secondary payment i.e. the d function: S(y0|ŷ, θ̂) − S(θ0) − 1 and the penalty
for inaccuracies: d(y0|ŷ, θ̂)[V (ŷ) − Z(2)], while listing the first and secondary
payments of the mechanism (Steps 6 and 8 respectively), the total payment and
the winner’s utility. Finally, the last column is the ratio between the cost of
production x(y) and data collection c(θ0).
From Table 1 it can be seen that in this particular instance, and at a required
sample precision of 4, the selected agent from our mechanism is the winner of
the second score auction with no uncertainty, w = w′. This shows that our
mechanism identified the ‘proper’ winner, i.e. the agent who should have won
based solely on actual production, after he generated a sample of 4 observations.
22
Table 1: A single iteration of the mechanism.
θ0 w w
′ d(·) Penalty 1st Pay 2nd Pay Total P Utility Cost ratio
1 11 14 -1.5862 -1.7624 1.1111 -3.4723 -2.3612 -2.5621 110.09
4 14 14 -0.9166 -0.5276 0.5756 -0.1340 0.4417 0.0692 49.88
10 14 14 -0.9125 -0.9636 1.0560 -0.0171 1.0389 0.6554 19.95
16 14 14 -0.8846 -0.7820 0.8840 0.1577 1.0417 0.6472 12.47
22 14 14 -0.9417 -0.6751 0.7169 0.2874 1.0043 0.5989 9.07
28 14 14 -0.8786 -0.7433 0.8460 0.2266 1.0726 0.6562 7.13
34 14 14 -0.9168 -0.9277 1.0119 0.0906 1.1024 0.6751 5.87
40 14 14 -0.9382 -0.9601 1.0233 0.0581 1.0814 0.6430 4.99
46 14 14 -0.9213 -0.9190 0.9975 0.1251 1.1225 0.6732 4.34
52 14 14 -0.8727 -0.8030 0.9201 0.3023 1.2224 0.7621 3.84
58 14 14 -0.9004 -0.7504 0.8334 0.3573 1.1907 0.7194 3.44
64 14 14 -0.8758 -0.7663 0.8750 0.3885 1.2635 0.7812 3.12
70 14 14 -0.8820 -0.7550 0.8561 0.4070 1.2631 0.7698 2.85
76 14 14 -0.8658 -0.7755 0.8958 0.4239 1.3197 0.8154 2.63
82 14 14 -0.8671 -0.7665 0.8840 0.4551 1.3391 0.8239 2.43
88 14 14 -0.8638 -0.7765 0.8990 0.4678 1.3668 0.8406 2.27
94 14 14 -0.8645 -0.7864 0.9096 0.4791 1.3887 0.8515 2.12
100 14 14 -0.8687 -0.7578 0.8724 0.5239 1.3964 0.8482 2.00
However, the d(·) function is not equal to −1, as it is in expectation, which
leads to a heavier fine for the selected agent of our mechanism. Hence the 2nd
Pay, total payment and utility are negative for some values of θ0. Specifically
regarding the selected agent’s utility, it is interesting to observe the loss of an
imprecise agent, and the relation with our theoretical results in Section 5, where
we discussed how estimates of low precision may end up winning the auction but
inflicting additional losses instead of gains (Theorem 1, Case (3)). Still, despite
the good intuition that this analysis provides for our mechanism, it should be
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noted that these results are from a single iteration, hence exposed to heavy bias
from the random inputs (i.e. costs and qualities).
6.2. Numerical simulations
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Figure 2: Dependence of percentage of ‘proper’ winners and expected utility on
sample precision.
Having detailed the simulation’s input parameters and analysed a snapshot
of the mechanism, we now present our numerical findings after simulating the
mechanism 105 times. In Fig. 2 we summarise the convergence of our mech-
anism. It can be seen that for the specific scenario we consider, it takes a
relatively small required precision, for the outcome of our mechanism to be the
same as the outcome of the second score auction with no uncertainty, where
agents directly report their realised qualities (i.e. Second Score: Outcome).
In fact, for required precisions above the area of 50 the selected agent from
our mechanism and the winner of the second score auction are the same agents
in more than 95% of the iterations of the mechanism (Fig. 2(a)). In addition
to this, our analytic findings in Section 5 are validated in Fig. 2(b), where we
notice that selected agent’s expected utility increases as the required precision
increases. The utility the selected agent expects to derive is less than the second
score auction’s winner expected utility (Second Score: Belief), had he been able
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to generate and report his belief of his quality freely. As it is expected, as the
required precision increases both auctions approach the second score auction in
a setting with no uncertainty where the winner can report his actual production
from the beginning (Second Score: Outcome). The differences that appear are
attributed to those cases where the winners of the two auctions do not coincide,
hence the winner faces losses.
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Figure 3: The selected agent’s expected payment for both production and pre-
diction and ratio of production to prediction costs.
The payment the selected agent in our mechanism and in the conventional
benchmark expects to derive, as well as, his average costs for the required pre-
cision θ0 ∈ [1, 100] are shown in Fig. 3. The penalties for inaccuracies, and
the principal’s compensation for the data collection costs have a clear impact
on the expected payment as shown in Fig. 3(a). The expected payment in our
mechanism starts lower than the two benchmark auctions, but it increases as
the precision increases. The stability in the payments of the other auctions is to
be expected since there is no data collection before the auction hence no com-
pensation, while the higher payments for our mechanism will not be an issue in
realistic applications since the data collection costs tend to be significantly lower
than the production costs. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the payments’
differences are highlighted in the plot due to its scale, with this issue related to
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the particular selection of simulation parameters and not to the mechanism it-
self. In fact, even after setting the upper bound of the cost collection parameter
equal to 0.002 and using a linear cost function, for relatively high precisions,
information collection cost ends up very close to some agents’ production costs.
We demonstrate this data sensitivity in Fig. 3(b), where we plot the logarithmic
ratio of production to prediction costs.
7. Conclusions
In this article we introduced a novel mechanism for multi-dimensional pro-
curement auctions where the agents’ qualities are uncertain and the principal
can only verify them after the project is completed. The principal cannot en-
force truthful reporting of costs and qualities through external means nor she
can force agents to provide quality-cost estimates of extremely high precisions.
Initially the principal procures an item or a service from a group of agents
by implementing a standard second score auction, only now the agents’ ranking
is calculated based on their reported estimates of their qualities and costs. The
agent with the higher score is allocated the contract to provide the agreed item
or service and receives the second score payment. After he fulfils his part of the
contract he receives a secondary payment based on both the reported estimate
and the actual production observed by the principal. The secondary payment
uses a strictly proper scoring rule to evaluate the selected agent’s posterior
belief of his quality once the project is complete and the principal can witness
the outcome.
We showed that the mechanism is immune to the agents’ combined misre-
porting of quality and costs. In addition to that, we showed that participating
agents invest the amount of the resources required when generating the es-
timates, while they expect to have a positive utility if they are allocated the
project. Although, the rest of the agents incur losses due to the information col-
lections costs, the payment to the agent that receives and completes the project
at his reported quality exceeds the production and information costs, provided
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that the estimate is of relative high precision.
As the assumption about the required precision indicates, there are some
limitations regarding practical elements of the mechanism. Although we proved
analytically that our mechanism implements the standard second score auction’s
outcome in terms of the selected agent’s expected utility, numerical simulations
demonstrated how sensitive the mechanism is to the precision of the quality
predictions, and hence to the resources invested in preparing the bids. This
calls for extra attention by the principal; the required precision must be set at a
level whereby the theoretical properties of the mechanism are not compromised
while the agents are willing to participate and expect to cover more than their
data collection and production cost if they are allocated the project. Therefore,
an early ‘consultation’ stage may be required to set the required precision based
on prior history of industry practices.
A final practical issue of the proposed mechanism is its potential vulnerabil-
ity to collusion; a possibility, even if such behaviour is often considered illegal
by regulating authorities. Literature has identified several cases where single-
dimensional auctions, which in turn can be extended to their multi-dimensional
counterparts introduced by Che (1993), can be vulnerable to collusion. However,
even for single-dimensional auctions collusion is not a straightforward process.
In more detail, Mailath & Zemsky (1991) analyse the non-trivial process of iden-
tifying an auction winner and calculating payments to the losers within a cartel.
More recently, Che & Kim (2009) introduced third-party uninformed representa-
tives to coordinate the formation and actions of multiple cartels, without really
considering practicalities such as how the actual side-payments will be issued so
that that they do not raise suspicion to regulation authorities.
The fact that efficient collusion assumes some form of coordination within
the cartels suggests that our mechanism could be less vulnerable mainly due
the additional complexity brought by the uncertain qualities. Bargaining within
the cartel now is an even more complex process given that agents have to invest
costly resources in estimating their qualities and then be held accountable for
that uncertainty not only by the principal, but also by the other participants in
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their cartel. Naturally, bargaining under uncertain and asymmetric information
can be less efficient than bargaining under perfect information. Such complex
behaviour exceeds the scope of this paper and provides a very interesting and
particularly challenging line of future work.
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